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In a Nutshell… 
 The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) is the 
largest study of new firm formation that has ever been undertaken in Australia. CAUSEE 
follows the development of several samples of new and emerging firms over time. In this 
report we focus on the drivers of outcomes – in terms of reaching an operational stage vs. 
terminating the effort – of 493 randomly selected nascent firms whose founders have been 
comprehensively interviewed on two occasions, 12 months apart. We investigate the outcome 
effects of three groups of variables: Characteristics of the Venture; Resources Used in the 
Start-Up Process and Characteristics of the Start-Up Process Itself.  
In a nutshell, this is what we have found: 
• Characteristics of the venture affect the duration of the start-up process, without 
necessarily making the start-ups more or less successful in the end. Specifically, 
retailing start-ups have a shorter process to get their ventures operational, whereas 
start-ups that are technically more sophisticated, more innovative, and/or start with 
higher ambitions typically take longer to either establish or terminate (pp. 16-22). A 
product- rather than service provision focus seems to make it harder to reach an 
operational state while the opposite is true for ventures that refrain from any online 
sales.   
• The experience of the business founders is relatively more important than their 
education in terms of achieving outcomes. Experience in the same industry as the 
start-up being created appears to be particularly important whereas prior start-up 
experience seems influential only if it was successful (pp. 26-34). 
• The amount of money invested has little impact on outcomes; much less so than most 
people would believe. However, those who are willing to take on some credit card 
debt and bank loans are more likely to get their venture up and running (pp. 34-41). 
• There is strong support that effort and action have a major influence on the outcome. 
Planning and the passing of time have no positive links to getting operational, 
whereas the hours invested and completion of concrete, start-up activities – preferably 
at an even pace – are strongly related to positive outcomes (pp. 22-23; 45-49). 
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• The results also point to the importance of being adaptable and willing to re-orientate 
the start-up in the face of new evidence, rather than being locked into a narrow, pre-
determined path from a very early stage (pp. 49; 56-59).  
• The results give us strong reason to question the virtue of business plans, especially 
when they are used as an action plan to be followed step by step. This may be because 
planning diverts attention from action or makes the start-up less adaptable (cf. above). 
These are not disadvantages that necessarily follow from planning, but our results 
suggest they often occur as a by-product of planning if they are not actively and 
purposely avoided. In line with the previous point we find revision of the business 
plan to be associated with positive outcome effects, and we should also point out that 
we find no evidence of detrimental effects of financial forecasting (pp. 50; 54-61).  
• We find a clear, negative association between founders having a non-European ethnic 
descent and the outcomes of the start-up process. This disturbing result deserves 
further scrutiny in future research. We stress that this result should not be interpreted 
as a difference between indigenous Australians vs. those of European descent. The 
number of indigenous founders in the study is too small to analyse this group 
separately (pp. 23-26). 
• Much previous research suggests that successful entrepreneurs have strong social- and 
people-orientated skills: excelling at identifying, cultivating and using the competence 
of others. While we find less clear cut evidence of this in the current report we believe 
that in the light of the cumulative evidence on the issue this is also a potential success 
factor worthy of mention (pp. 31; 51-52).   
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Introduction 
The creation of new firms is a tremendously important phenomenon. A recent, careful 
review of 87 analyses in 57 recent studies confirms earlier claims that new firms play very 
significant roles in employment creation, productivity growth and innovation (van Praag & 
Versloot, 2007). Yet, relatively little is known about what makes an attempt to start a new 
firm successful and what factors contribute to terminate such efforts without a new firm being 
created. This applies even more so to Australia, where no broadly based, systematic effort to 
address this question has been undertaken previously. A major reason for this lack of 
knowledge is that on-going business start-ups are challenging to identify and, consequently, 
difficult to study. Registration of the business in any type of register often happens late in the 
process and hence no suitable sampling frames exist for on-going start-ups in their early 
stages.  
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) 
addresses this knowledge gap. It is the largest study of new firm creation ever undertaken in 
Australia. In a nutshell, CAUSEE aims to uncover the factors that initiate, hinder and 
facilitate the process of emergence of new, independent firms. Through a novel 
methodological approach, a large representative sample of on-going business start-up efforts 
was identified and interviewed in 2007/8. The founders were re-interviewed 12 months later 
to determine the progress of the start-up. While CAUSEE also includes other samples, and 
information about other types of performance measures, we focus this report on drivers of 
success and failure in typical business start-up processes. More precisely, we address the 
following question:  
In a random sample of on-going Australian start-up efforts, which factors help the 
business get up and running, and which contribute to termination of the start-up? 
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Knowledge of this kind has obvious value to prospective business founders themselves. 
In addition, such knowledge is essential for those who deal with emerging businesses such as 
educators, consultants, support agencies, financiers and other resource providers, business 
partners, and policy-makers.  
 Note that we portray this report as ‘preliminary’. This is for two reasons. First, the 
relationships among the many elements of the start-up process are intricate and complex. We 
intend to continue to deepen the analysis, which may lead to (partial) revision of some results 
or interpretations thereof. Second, data collection for CAUSEE will continue with two more 
waves of comprehensive interviewing. This longer term perspective may also lead to new 
revelations and (partial) revision of what we have concluded in the present report. 
 
Background on the CAUSEE Project 
The CAUSEE project is part of a young research tradition aiming at a) the early 
identification and assessment of the (relative) prevalence of business start-ups, and b) 
understanding the process of their development and eventual performance by following them 
through repeated data collections over time. Identification and assessment of prevalence is 
the main purpose of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project (see Hindle & 
O'Conner, 2006; Reynolds et al., 2005) while the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED) and its international partner studies (see Davidsson, 2006; Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & 
Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds & Curtin, 2008) also includes the development process. While 
building on experiences from these international studies, CAUSEE is a standalone project 
with unique contents, and the only longitudinal study to date of this kind in Australia.    
The project has identified four samples of new or emerging firms. The first is a national, 
random sample of Nascent Firms (NF), i.e., efforts where concrete steps towards creating a 
firm have been taken, although the firm is not yet trading regularly in the market. The second 
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is a national, random sample of Young Firms (YF), i.e., independent businesses that trade 
regularly but had done so for less than four years when first interviewed. The remaining two 
samples are over samples of ‘high potential’ (HP) start-ups in the NF and YF categories. The 
HP start-ups were recruited from a large number of sources rather than randomly sampled 
(Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, & Senyard, 2008). In this report we focus entirely on the first 
category, the national, random sample of Nascent Firms. More precisely, our sample consists 
of 493 NF whose founders have been comprehensively interviewed on two occasions, 12 
months apart.  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the main contents of the CAUSEE interviews and the 
assumed relationships between key elements of the new firm creation process: Environment, 
Venture type; Resources; Process, and Outcomes. Ultimately the research aims at explaining 
outcomes; in the next section we will elaborate on the specific outcomes analysed in this 
report. As regards Environment we have in a previous report (Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, 
& Reynolds, 2008) provided some comparisons between Australian and US start-up activity, 
and in future reports we will analyse geographical differences within Australia as well. In the 
present report the only environment issue that we examine is industry affiliation, which we 
categorise under its alternative interpretation as Venture Type. Thus, we will not examine 
urban-rural issues or differences among Australian states in this report.  
Conspicuous in its absence in Figure 1 is an oval labelled ‘The Entrepreneur’ or ‘The 
Founder’. This is because the emerging venture or firm is the core unit of analysis in the 
CAUSEE research; not the founder(s) (cf. Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001). From the venture’s 
perspective the founders are an important part of its resource base, captured by Resources in 
the figure. The interviews also cover financial resources, perceived resource advantages and 
disadvantages, and resource acquisition strategies. All of this will be discussed in our results 
section.  
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Figure 1. The components of the process of new firm emergence 
 
Another aspect of avoiding over-focusing on the individual is our explicit consideration 
of characteristics of the venture itself. It has been observed that entrepreneurship research has 
paid too little attention to characteristics of the venture (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
Hence the Venture Type box in the figure, which refers to dimensions such as innovativeness 
(or newness), technological sophistication, online vs. brick-and-mortar, etc., but also to the 
initial level of ambition of the venture in terms of aiming at a life style business vs. being a 
growth orientated enterprise. As noted above we will also examine effects of industry 
affiliation under this heading. 
CAUSEE adopts a process view of new venture creation, explaining the central position 
of the Venture Creation Process in Figure 1. The most important process contents are 
questions recording the initiation or completion of over 30 ‘gestation activities’ such as 
seeking finance; writing a business plan; buying inputs; joining business associations; 
seeking advice; hiring employees, etc. Other aspects of Venture Creation Process concern 
Resources
Environment
Venture Type
Venture 
Creation 
Process
Outcomes
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how the process was triggered in the first place, the use and role of planning, and the 
occurrence of changes to the business idea over time.  
As indicated by the arrows in Figure 1, entrepreneurship research has moved beyond 
simplistic, direct, additive and linear relationships. Issues of fit and interdependence between 
the different components will consequently be a key interest in the project. In this report we 
will consider this mainly through the use of so called ‘control variables’. We will also analyse 
direct questions about the fit (or relatedness) between the type of venture on the one hand, 
and the knowledge and other resources of the founders on the other.  
 
Method 
Sampling of start-ups 
As explained above this report builds on a random sample of start-ups that were 
captured early in the process and which are followed over time. The random nature of the 
sample is important because it makes the sample likely to be representative for business start-
ups in Australia. For example, if start-ups were instead sampled among those who were in 
contact with some particular support agency or program, the sample would not be 
representative for Australian start-ups because highly experienced, repeat entrepreneurs may 
feel no need for such services. Similarly, identifying these start-ups early in the process is 
also important for representativeness as it makes it possible to avoid survivor bias. A sample 
of established young firms (drawn randomly from some register) reporting back on their early 
days of development would not be a random sample of start-up efforts because terminated 
cases are excluded. In addition, such a procedure would have issues of memory decay and 
hindsight bias – problems which are greatly reduced with the CAUSEE design.  
With a random sample (and under certain assumptions), statistical inference (Oakes, 
1986) can be used to draw conclusions about Australian start-ups in general, based on the 
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sample. In order to get as close as possible to the ideal of a completely random sample we 
used an approach previously developed for PSED and GEM (see Reynolds, 2009). First, 
30,105 successful contacts were made with randomly selected Australian households via 
random digit dialling (RDD). After ascertaining that the respondents were over 18 years old 
and living in the household, they were asked a series of screening questions aimed at 
establishing whether they were actively involved in an on-going business start-up in which 
they were going to be a (part) owner. Figure 2 summarises the complex screening procedure. 
Of the 1,010 NF identified, 625 participated in the ensuing, 40-60 minutes long interview. 
After 12 months, 493 of these were successfully re-contacted and re-interviewed for another 
40-60 minutes. Consequently, comprehensive information has been collected about the 
ventures and their development over time. These 493 start-up efforts constitute the sample for 
this report.2
The project will continue to re-interview the founders at 24 and 36 months after the 
initial interview. Apart from reducing problems of memory decay and hindsight bias, 
following the cases over time also makes it possible to observe factors that we presume cause 
differences to outcomes of the process at one point in time, and observe the effects of those 
factors – the outcomes themselves – at a later point in time. In our case the outcomes are 
typically assessed 12 months later than the presumed causes.  
  
 
                                                          
2 Threats to statistical representativeness in this procedure arise from a) non-random non-response in the 
initial screening interview; b) non-random non-participation among cases eligible for the long interview; c) 
non-random non-response in the 12 month follow-up interview; d) over sampling of team start-ups with 
founders from different households, and e) over sampling of start-up processes of long duration (Davidsson, 
2006). However, our preliminary checks do not indicate any serious sampling biases. 
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Figure 2.  Sampling and screening procedure 
1. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, 
including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?
2. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a 
new venture for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work?
3. Are you, alone or with others currently the owner of a business you help 
manage, including self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?
Initial Screening Questions
(N = 30,105)
NO
to allNon Eligible  Case
(N = 28,037)
Suspected 
Nascent Firm
YES
Suspected 
Nascent Firm
YES
Suspected Young 
Firm
YES
5a. Will you personally own all or part of  this 
business? 
6a. Has your monthly revenue been more than 
monthly expenses for more than six of the past 
twelve months?
Confirmation Questions for
Suspected Nascent Firm
4a. Over the past twelve months, have you done 
anything to help start a new business, such as ...? 
YES
YES
Confirmed Nascent 
Firm
(N = 1,010)
NO
NO
NO
5b. In what year did this business or self-
employment start?
Confirmation Questions for
Suspected Young Firm
4b. Has the business experienced any 12-month 
period where revenues were greater than all 
costs at least half the time?
YES
< 3 Years Ago
Confirmed Young 
Firm
(N = 1,058)
YES
NO
7. If takeover: Although running this business is new 
for you, is the business itself in a start-up stage?
YES
YES
NO 8. If spin-off: can you confirm that you are one 
of the owners of  the business?
YES
> 3 Years Ago
NO
NO
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Table 1 provides selected descriptive statistics of our sample of nascent firms. It is clear 
that the typical start-up in a random sample is tiny in scale and has rather modest future 
aspirations. When interpreting the results in this report it is important to take this into 
account.  
Table 1.  Descriptive characteristics of the random sample of nascent firms 
Median Funds Invested at first interview ($) $8,000 
Founding Team Composition  
    Solo 51% 
    Spouse Team 24% 
   Other two person team 11% 
   Three or more person team 14% 
Employing any staff at first interview 14% 
Median expected employment size in 5th year of operation 4 
Median expected sales in 5th year of operation $150,000 
Prefer to stay small and manageable 74% 
 
The outcomes investigated 
Assessing and interpreting outcomes (or performance) of new and small firms is 
challenging for a variety of reasons (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Cooper, 1993; Davidsson, 
2008). When the study is about emerging firms this problem is aggravated because typical 
outcomes such as revenue and profits are not yet relevant for large parts of the sample. In this 
report we focus on contrasting three outcomes. We examine whether when re-contacted 12 
months after the initial interview, the firm is: 
1.Operational (up and running), defined as having revenue for at least 6 of the past 12 
months (applies to 217 of 493 cases; 44%), or 
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2. Terminated, meaning that neither the respondent nor others are planning to undertake 
any further work on the start-up (applies to 139 of 493 cases; 28%), or 
3. Still trying to get operational (which applies to the 153 cases – 31% – that do not 
qualify for either of the above outcomes)?3
A simple interpretation of these outcomes would be that Operational is the best, 
Terminated is the worst and Still trying is somewhere in between. However, one limitation of 
using these outcomes as performance indicators is that ‘operational’ does not necessarily 
mean ‘successful’, and ‘terminated’ is not necessarily a worse outcome than ‘operational’ or 
‘still trying’. This is because those getting ‘operational’ may never become profitable and in 
such cases it is better to terminate early rather than late. This said, we will assume, by and 
large, that getting operational is the preferred outcome.  
 
It is none-the-less essential to contrast all three outcomes rather than just comparing, 
e.g., those getting operational with all others. Otherwise one can easily confound factors that 
truly affect the success vs. failure of the start-up process with those that simply indicate that it 
takes longer to reach a resolution in either direction. The hypothetical results patterns in 
Table 2 can serve to illustrate this. Here we look at six possible ways specific venture 
characteristics may affect outcomes.  
In the table a positive effect, indicated by one or more ‘+’s, means contributing to what 
we presume is a better outcome, or the first of the two outcomes in each contrast (column 
heading). Hence, plus signs mean being associated with Operational rather than Terminated; 
with Operational rather than Still Trying, and with Still Trying rather than Terminated, 
respectively. The number of ‘+’s indicates the strength of relationship (explained below). 
Conversely, negative influences on outcomes are indicated by one or more ‘-‘s   
 
                                                          
3 Note that because 16 cases terminated after getting operational the counts and percentages do not sum up 
to 493 and 100, respectively. 
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Table 2.  Hypothetical response patterns and their interpretation 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
vs. 
Terminated 
Operational 
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Characteristic 1 ++++ ++ ++++ 
Characteristic  2  none – – ++++ 
Characteristic 3  none  + – – –  
Characteristic 4  ++++ none none 
Characteristic 5  none none ++++ 
Characteristic 6 none none none 
 
In these analyses Characteristic 1 can relatively safely be interpreted as a ‘success 
factor’. Having (more of) the characteristic is associated with a greater likelihood of getting 
operational and a lesser likelihood of having terminated. Characteristic 2 is positively 
associated with being still trying vs. termination and may have been interpreted as a success 
indicator if only the third (rightmost) analysis were performed, or regarded as uninfluential if 
only the first (leftmost) analysis were considered. In actual fact, the result across the three 
analyses suggests this is a factor extending the time it takes to reach an outcome in either 
direction, not being indicative of success or failure per se. Characteristic 3 does the opposite; 
it shortens the process. Characteristic 4 and Characteristic 5 are both possible ‘success 
factors’ albeit not as clearly as Characteristic 1. Their influence could have gone undetected 
had not all three analyses been performed. Finally, Characteristic 6 is uninfluential and 
therefore unproblematic – the interpretation of its role would be correct regardless of whether 
just one or all three contrasts were performed. 
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Types of analyses and presentation of results 
The results we report will be based on both bivariate and multivariate analyses to 
statistically test whether a factor is associated with particular outcomes. Overall, the 
multivariate analyses can be considered a stronger, more robust test. In bivariate analyses – 
cross-tabulations or means comparisons – we examine how one factor at a time is related to 
each of the three outcomes. Bivariate results are always valid in the sense that they state the 
empirical fact that, for example, cases having (more of) Characteristic 4 are more likely to be 
operational (rather than terminated) regardless of whether this is a causal relationship or not. 
However, careless interpretation of bivariate results can lead to seriously wrong conclusions. 
For example, let us assume that founders with more relevant education and experience are 
better at getting a given start-up to an operational stage. Let us also assume that more 
ambitious, innovative or technically sophisticated ventures are ultimately no more or less 
successful than more ordinary ventures, but that they take longer to reach their final outcome. 
If in addition we assume that more experienced/educated founders try to start more 
ambitious/innovative/sophisticated ventures we see the problem with bivariate analysis: it 
may well look like founders with more experience/education perform worse, when in actual 
fact they perform better given the type of venture they are trying to start.   
This possible confounding of drivers of (remaining) process length with genuine drivers 
of process outcomes highlights the need for multivariate analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1998) and the use of so called control variables. In multivariate analysis – in our case 
logistic regression (Menard, 2002) – all the presumed outcome drivers ‘compete’ with one 
another to explain the outcome. While not providing full evidence of causality, the 
multivariate analysis (and the time separation between presumed cause and effect) makes 
such interpretations more credible, especially if there are also theoretical and/or logical 
reasons to assume causality.  
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It is inevitable that while all our firms were in a nascent stage when first interviewed, 
some of them were captured at the very beginning of the process whereas others were close to 
reaching an operational stage. Therefore, one essential control variable is stage of 
development when first captured. We will use number of gestation activities already 
completed at the first interview to control for this. As per the above example we empirically 
identify a number of venture type indicators that appear associated with process length and 
use these as controls in the subsequent analyses. The intention with the multivariate analyses, 
then, is to unravel the effects of suspected outcome drivers after the effects of initial stage 
and venture type have already been accounted for. In many cases, a multivariate test may cast 
doubts that statistically significant bivariate relationships represent independent, causal 
effects. However, it can also happen that true effects that are concealed in the bivariate 
formulation are revealed when tested in a multivariate setting. In essence, the multivariate 
tests are a more robust test.            
In the results section we will summarise the results for different categories of possible 
outcome drivers (related to Venture Type, Resources, and Process, respectively) in tables 
similar to Table 2. The strongest results, indicated by ‘++++’ or ‘– – – –’ are results that hold 
up for the multivariate analyses at the conventional 5% risk level; ‘+++’ or ‘– – –’ indicate 
significance only at the 10% level. Results that are only present in the bivariate analyses are 
indicated by ‘++’ or ‘– –’ if significant at 5% or by a single ‘+’ or ‘–’ if only significant at 
10%. A result being statistically significant means that the result is likely to exist in the 
underlying population of Australian start-ups4
 
. 
  
                                                          
4 Technically it is more correct to say that a significant result (under assumptions of absence of model 
misspecification and non-response bias) shows that the sample is unlikely to be drawn from a population 
where the said effect is in fact non-existent.  
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Results 
Results Related to Venture Type 
 Industry affiliation. Table 3 summarises the results for industry affiliation. The first 
column, ‘applies to %’, reports the percentage of cases that belongs to each industry 
category5
The main result here is perhaps the somewhat surprising absence of marked industry 
differences. The many occurrences of ‘none’ in the table may give the impression that the 
choice of which industry to enter is largely inconsequential for early venture progress. 
However, as we will show later, this is not the case if we also consider the venture team 
because the founders’ experience from the industry they enter – whichever industry that 
might be – clearly does matter. Further, the results for retailing should not lure one to 
conclude that this is somehow an easier industry to succeed in. What the results in Table 3 
indicate is that retailing start-ups on average reach a resolution in either direction sooner than 
start-ups in other industries. In an earlier report (Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, & Reynolds, 
2008) we could show that the proportion of retailing firms was much higher in our sample of 
nascent firms than in our sample of young (already up and running) firms. This suggests that 
while retailing start-ups may be relatively easier to get to an operational stage (or at least to 
get up and running faster) it may actually be one of the tougher industries to survive in. This 
echoes economist Paul Geroski’s (1995) notion that while barriers to entry to an industry may 
often seem surprisingly low, barriers to survival may still be high. 
. The industries that have relatively high representation in the sample are analysed 
separately. Less prevalent industries, which do not yield a large enough sample size for 
acceptable statistical certainty have been combined in an ‘other’ category.  
In summary, our results show that other than retailing start-ups reaching resolution 
quicker there are no systematic outcome differences across industries. However, this does not 
                                                          
5 In most tables we will report simple percentages of cases that fall into each category 
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mean that a given individual or team has equal chances of success regardless of industry 
choice as results reported later will show that their experience in the chosen industry does 
matter. Despite the first impression one might get from Table 3 our results do not suggest 
prospective founders should go for retailing opportunities in order to get an easier ride. 
Table 3. Outcome effects of industry affiliation 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to  
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Retailing 22 none ++++ – – – –  
Manufacturing 8 none none none 
Construction 7 none none none 
Business consulting of 
service 
9 none none none 
Consumer service 14 none none none 
Health, Education or 
Social service 
13 none none none 
Other industries 
combined 
28 none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
++++ or – – – –: significant at p<5% in multivariate (more robust) analysis 
+++ or – – –: significant at p<10% in multivariate (more robust) analysis 
++ or – –: significant at p<5% in bivariate (less robust) analysis only 
+ or –: significant at p<10% in bivariate (less robust) analysis only 
none: not significant in either analysis 
 
Venture technology. Table 4 summarises results concerning the technology of the 
venture. Product Focus indicates that the start-up is mainly going to sell products rather than 
services. Brick-and-Mortar-Only reflects that the founders intend to have no part of the 
venture’s sales generated online. Technology < 5 Years indicates that according to the 
respondent the venture’s core technology was not available more than five years before the 
first interview. Hitech signals that the respondent answered affirmatively to the question 
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“Would you consider this business to be hitech?”  R&D Focus reflects that the respondent 
agreed that spending on research and development will be a major focus of the venture. 
Unlike these dichotomous (yes/no) variables, Newness is a summated index variable with a 
range from zero to 12 reflecting the (self-assessed) degree of novelty (or innovation) that the 
venture introduces across four domains: the product itself; the method of producing or 
sourcing the product; the method of selling or promotion, and the choice of markets or 
customers to target (cf. Dahlqvist, 2007; Schumpeter, 1934). Hence, this variable is not 
restricted only to the technology of the venture but captures also other aspects of newness. 
Table 4. Outcome effects of venture technology 
Outcome   
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to 
 % 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Product Focus 38 – – –  – – – –  none 
Brick-and-Mortar-Only 50 ++++ ++++ none 
Technology < 5 yrs 30 none + none 
Hitech 31 none – – – –  ++++ 
R&D Focus 45 none – –  +++ 
Newness N/A none – – – –  none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
The main – and important – pattern to extract from Table 4 is the realisation that start-
up processes based on more innovative or sophisticated technology take longer to complete. 
Other than using technology less than five years old, all indicators of a firm’s technological 
sophistication suggest firms are more likely to be still trying than to become operational. 
Hitech and R&D focus also indicate firms are more likely to be still trying than terminated. It 
is important not to confuse this result with the ultimate success or failure of the start-up. 
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Previous research indicates that although they tend to take longer to get up and running and 
indeed find it  harder to get operational, those that succeed among this group of more 
technically advanced or innovative firms are more likely to become highly profitable and 
growing businesses (Storey’s 1994; Audretsch, 1995). But equally, because of the cost and 
uncertainty associated with innovation and more advanced technology, it is also likely that 
this group will yield many of those start-ups ending with considerable financial losses. 
However, the results reported in Table 4 are too early stage to really speak to that issue. 
 This said, some of the results go beyond indicating mere prolonging of the start-up 
process. The results suggest that product-based ventures are less likely to get up and running. 
In addition – and perhaps a bit surprisingly – those ventures that choose not to offer internet 
sales at all also are more likely to get operational. To some extent this may reflect the earlier 
finding that firms offering services are more likely than product focussed to be operational 
since many types of services simply cannot be delivered online. The Hitech and R&D Focus 
variables clearly suggest that start-ups using more advanced technology, while perhaps more 
glamorous to be associated with, take longer to complete. The results for Newness 
underscores this point and hints that it may even make it harder to ever reach a satisfactory 
outcome. This said, it is encouraging that newness has negative effect only in the middle 
regression; that is, it is not clearly associated with an increased likelihood of being terminated 
rather than either operational or still trying. Newness is an entrepreneurial ideal, and valuable 
to society, so it would be disappointing to obtain results suggesting that business founders 
should refrain from it. More detailed analyses (not reported here) suggests that it is in 
particular newness in the area of producing and/or sourcing (and to a lesser extent product 
newness) that is associated with negative outcome effects, whereas novel approaches to 
marketing and selling does not seem to influence process duration or eventual outcomes in 
any substantial way.   
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Initial level of ambition. We include level of ambition as a ‘venture type’ characteristic 
since ambition, arguably, has effects that are similar to that of technological sophistication. A 
business initially set up with an ambition to grow large may take longer because it requires 
more preparation and possibly more work on convincing other resource providers of the 
value of the business proposition. On the other hand, founders of more ambitious start-ups 
may invest much more time and money, contributing to the start-up becoming operational 
sooner. As with other ‘venture type’ characteristics it is therefore important to investigate 
these potentially confounding effects and control for them in later analyses involving other 
types of explanatory variables.  
Table 5. Outcome effects of initial level of ambition 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to 
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Not Home Based 19 ++ none + 
Pty Ltd Legal Form 14 ++ none + 
Growth Focus  25 none – – – –  ++ 
Sales Aspiration 5th yr; 
log dollars 
N/A none –  ++ 
Employment Size 
Aspiration, 5th yr; FTE 
count 
N/A none – –  none 
Non–local Sales 
Aspiration; 5th yr % 
N/A – – – –  – – – –  ++++ 
International Sales 
Aspiration, yes/no 
7 +++ ++++ none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
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The first two variables, Not Home Based and Pty Ltd Legal Form both reflect an 
ambition to create a ‘real, standalone business’ rather than a source of supplementary income. 
They are both associated with an increased likelihood of getting up and running and a 
somewhat lesser propensity to give up the start-up effort. This probably reflects that founders 
of such start-ups also invest more time and other resources to achieve these results. When 
interpreting the percentages, please note that a significant proportion of the start-ups have not 
yet decided on location or legal form at the first interview.  
The remaining five variables indicate an ambition to grow the business in terms of 
sales, employment and geographical scope. It should be noted that the level of growth 
ambition may not be high in absolute terms; only higher than it is among the founders they 
are contrasted with. Growth Focus reflects the response to a dichotomous question: do the 
founders aim at growing the business as large as possible, or would they prefer to keep it 
small and easily managed by themselves? The following three variables, Sales Aspiration 5th 
Year; Employment Size Aspiration, 5thr Year, and Non-local Sales Aspiration 5tr year, are 
continuous and self-explanatory. The last variable, International Sales Aspiration, reflects 
that the founders aim at some level of international sales, regardless of how large a 
proportion. 
In the main, the results for these variables suggest that the start-up process takes 
longer for growth-orientated businesses. Within the time frame studied there is no strong 
evidence that those started with greater ambitions will in fact achieve better outcomes. 
Conversely, other than the negative result for geographical growth ambitions (Non-local 
Sales) there is no indication that those starting with an ambition to grow ultimately perform 
worse, either. The other indicator of geographic growth ambition, International Sales 
Aspiration actually shows results opposite to those for Non-local Sales, being associated with 
a higher likelihood of becoming operational, compared to termination as well as ‘still trying’. 
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In all, our analyses show that a range of venture characteristics are clearly associated 
with making the start-up process longer or shorter, yet few have a clear connection to more or 
less successful outcomes. We find that: 
• Start-ups in Retailing on average reach a ‘final’ outcome more quickly.  
• The opposite pattern holds true for ventures classified as Hitech and Growth Focus, 
as well as those with higher aspirations for Non-local Sales.  
• Important influences on outcomes – and possibly not limited to affecting the 
duration of the process – were noted also for Product Focus and Newness. While 
possibly associated with a chance of higher returns if successful, those pursuing 
ventures with those characteristics seem to be up for a more difficult journey. 
Conversely, those refraining from Internet sales (Brick-and-Mortar-Only) are more 
likely to get operational. 
In order to reduce the risk for misinterpreting the influence of other variables these 
seven variables just mentioned – Retailing, Brick-and-Mortar-Only, Hitech, Growth Focus, 
Non-local Sales, Product Focus and Newness – will be retained as control variables in all 
multivariate analyses reported in subsequent sections of this report. As the influence of other 
venture characteristics were weaker or less consistent retaining these seven should be 
sufficient for control purposes. 
 
Results Related to Resources  
 Human Resources I: Hours invested. Table 6 establishes a simple but important fact 
about new firm creation: the outcome of the process is strongly related to the amount of effort 
the owners put in. Far from all founders devote full time effort to the focal start-up as some of 
them stay in full or part-time employment while trying to get the business up and running. 
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Others – habitual entrepreneurs – split their time between this start-up and other new or 
established businesses that they are engaged in.  
The effect of amount of hours invested is very strong and persistent compared to almost 
all other effects discussed in this report. As an indication, among the 20% of founders who 
have invested the highest number of hours, 70 percent have got their start-up to an 
operational state. Among those 20 percent investing the smallest amount of time the 
corresponding figure is 14 percent, with intermediate levels of effort being associated with 
operational percentages between these extremes. To some extent reverse causality is at work 
here: those who gave up early in the 12 month interval between the interview waves would 
not have invested high numbers of hours. Even so, the message is pretty clear: it usually takes 
a fair amount of ‘sweat equity’ to get a new business up and running. By contrast, no clear 
effect emerges for the amount of time owners have managed to get ‘unpaid (non-owner) 
helpers’ to contribute, which presumably in the main reflects help received from friends and 
family members who are not also part owners in the business.  
Table 6. Outcome effects amount of work invested  
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Hours of work invested 
by owners in last 12 
months 
++++ ++++ ++++ 
Hors of work invested 
by unpaid helpers in 
last 12 months 
none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
Human Resources II: Founder background. A first important ‘background’ 
characteristic is whether there is just one founder or a team backing the venture. From the 
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venture level perspective, more founders mean more human resources to draw upon. In line 
with this, much previous research has indicated that team start-ups tend to be more successful 
than their solo-run counterparts (Stam & Schutjens, 2004). As seen in Table 7 this is not the 
case in our data, possibly because we are covering the very early stages of venture 
development. Presumably, goal conflicts and other complications of having several people 
involved may make it harder to get to an operational stage. It could also be the case that the 
effect arises because teams more often start high ambition or technologically sophisticated 
firms. However, our results do not support this. If that were the case the effect should be 
stronger in the bivariate than in the multivariate analysis. In fact, the reverse is true: it is only 
in the multivariate analysis, after controlling for a range of venture type indicators that the 
negative team effect appears.  
Table 7. Outcome effects of founder background characteristics  
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to 
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Team (vs. Solo) 49 – – – –  none none 
Team Size N/A none none none 
Spouse Team 24 none ++ none 
Sex = All female 29 none none none 
Sex = All male 37 –  – –  none 
Sex = Mixed Team 33 none none none 
Age N/A none –  +++ 
Immigrant 27 none none none 
Ethnicity = Other than 
European descent 
20 – – – –  none –  
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
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 Previous research has shown that while just over half of all start-up teams are spousal 
teams (incl. de facto and same sex spousal (like) relationships), only a small minority match 
the stereotypical high-powered teams purposely assembled for their complementary business 
skills (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). In our data there is some (but relatively weak) 
indication that spousal teams get to an operational stage quicker.  
No marked effects of the sex of the founders emerge. As regards female entrepreneurs 
this accords with previous findings from research using methodology similar to ours (see 
Davidsson & Gordon, 2009) as well as entrepreneurship research more generally (DuRietz & 
Henrekson, 2000; Watson, 2002). While women are usually under represented among 
business founders, they are typically not under performing once they have entered the process 
of firm creation. If anything, in our data there is a slight tendency in the opposite direction. 
 We also find a weak effect suggesting older founders are less likely to terminate the 
start-up effort. We have previously reported (Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, & Reynolds, 
2008) that immigrants to Australia are neither over- nor under represented among nascent 
entrepreneurs. Table 7 shows there are no performance differences by immigrant status, 
either.  
The most important finding in Table 7, however, is the somewhat disturbing result that 
founders of non-European descent have lower probability of getting the start-up operational 
and instead face a higher likelihood of termination. In bivariate analysis, for founders of 
European descent the proportions being Operational vs. Terminated are 44 and 24 percent, 
respectively. By contrast, for solo and team start-ups by founders of non-European descent 
the corresponding proportions are 33 and 37 percent. These are quite sizeable differences for 
social science data. It is important to understand that this is a group level effect that does not 
in any way preclude founders of non-European descent from having spectacular success in 
entrepreneurship. This said, the aggregate result certainly points at an issue worth further 
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exploration in continued analysis of the CAUSEE data as well as in designated research that 
can delve deeper into the underlying mechanisms behind this effect. Similar results have been 
reported for African Americans in the US (Köllinger & Minniti, 2006; Reynolds, 2007). One 
thing we can say based on CAUSEE data is that there was no difference by ethnicity in the 
founders’ self-assessed success chances in the initial interview, so the difficulties encountered 
by those of non-European descent were apparently not anticipated by the founders 
themselves.   
 To sum up the effects of founder background characteristics we find that team start-
ups and those started by individuals of ethnic background other than European descent have 
somewhat lower incidence of getting the venture to an operational stage within the 12 months 
between the first and the second interview waves.  
Human Resources III: Founders’ education-based competence. Table 8 reveals that 
start-up outcomes are at best weakly related to educational attainment and where there is an 
influence, it is not necessarily positive. There is weak indication that founders with low 
education are more likely to terminate, but this effect disappears in multivariate analyses. 
Solo founders or teams with at least one member university educated appear to take longer to 
reach a resolution in either direction (becoming operational or terminating). The number of 
specific education-based skills (such as marketing, accounting, administration, etc.) is also 
associated with a longer process (although not as strongly as university education). None of 
the answers to questions about specific, education-based skills are systematically related to 
outcomes. Possibly, those with more education try to start more ambitious (and more 
complex) ventures (although this is something we try to control for in the multivariate 
analyses), or they are more often involved in sideline start-ups which they do not pursue very 
intensely. For completeness we have also included the ‘gestation activity’ of having taken 
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classes or attended seminars for the purpose of furthering this business start-up. Again, no 
effect of education emerges.  
In all, the education of the founders seems to have some influence on the duration of 
the start-up process, but no discernable effect on the ultimate outcome in terms of reaching an 
operational stage or terminating the venture. This is particularly clear from the analyses in the 
first results column, which directly contrasts these two outcomes. 
Table 8. Outcome effects of founders’ education 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies  
to  
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Highest education = 
high school 
20 none none –  
Highest education = 
university 
47 none – – – –  +++ 
Specific, education-
based functional skills 
N/A none none none 
No. of areas of 
education-based 
functional skills 
N/A none –  – –  
Has taken business 
classes or seminars for 
the purpose of this 
start–up 
58 none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
Human Resources IV: Founders’ experience-based competence. A first conclusion 
from comparing Operational vs. Still Trying in Table 9 with Table 8 is that start-up outcomes 
seem to be more related to the founders’ prior experience than to their education-based skills. 
However, there is a somewhat surprising absence of evidence of positive effects of previous 
start-up experience as such. This might reflect that not all business founders become start-up 
experts just because they have prior involvement in similar efforts. Indeed Dahlqvist et al. 
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(2000) found a negative effect of start-up experience on survival and no effect on high 
performance for young firms. However, there may also be counter-acting effects at work. For 
example, if experienced founders get better both at selecting what venture ideas to pursue in 
the first place, and at terminating an effort early when it no longer looks very promising, a net 
effect close to zero should be expected with respect to the outcomes contrasted in this report. 
This said, there is indication that previous start-up success is a valid (albeit not very strong) 
predictor of being able to get the start-up operational.  
The converse is not true for prior failure. In our analyses, prior failure is not 
significantly related to the outcome of the focal start-up. This is interesting, because it is 
more or less a truism in psychological research that one of the most reliable predictors of 
future behaviour (or performance) is past behaviour (or performance) at similar tasks 
(Ouellette & Wood, 1998). This does not hold true for prior failure in our data. Neither do our 
results support the popular lore (perhaps mainly North American) that prior failure 
experience is important for future success.  
Little evidence emerges in support of effects of indirect or so called ‘vicarious’ 
experience (Bandura, 1982). No effect at all is found for having a self-employed parent, and 
the negative effect on ‘Operational vs. Still Trying’ for prior small firm employee experience 
appears in isolation and seems hard to interpret.  
The positive effect of relevant experience, especially prior industry experience, is an 
important finding that is consistently reflected in the results through Table 9. As previously 
mentioned we found few industry differences (Table 3). The results here show that those who 
pursue venture ideas within an industry they have experience from are more likely to get the 
venture to an operational stage and, although to a lesser extent, less likely to terminate. This 
is further emphasised by a finer examination of the similar influences of work-experience 
based skills. This reveals that that those specific skills that drive the positive  
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Table 9. Outcome effects of founders’ prior experience 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to 
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Prior start-up 
experience (No. of 
start-ups) 
N/A – – –  none none 
No. of concurrent 
businesses run 
N/A none none – – –  
Prior start-up success 
(yes/no) 
36 +++ ++++ none 
Prior start-up failure 
(yes/no) 
15 none none none 
Self-employed parent 
(yes/no) 
67 none none none 
Experience as employee 
in small firm (yes/no) 
72 none – – – –  none 
Years of industry 
experience 
N/A ++++ none ++ 
Relatedness of venture 
idea’s to founders’ prior 
knowledge 
N/A ++ none none 
Years of managerial 
experience 
N/A none none – – –  
Managerial experience 
from large firm (yes/no) 
51 none – – – –   +++ 
Specific work-
experience based 
functional skills 
N/A ++ none ++ 
No. of experience based 
functional skills 
N/A + +++ none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
results tend to be industry-specific (such as knowledge essential for developing or producing 
products/services in the start-up’s industry). The results for relatedness, the extent to which 
the venture idea builds closely on the knowledge already possessed by the founders, provides 
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further support for this theme. However, the clearest and strongest positive effect on 
outcomes appears for years of industry experience in itself. Indeed, earlier work by Cooper et 
al. (1994) suggests industry specific knowledge is also associated with higher performance of 
those young firms that become up and running. 
Finally, the effect of having prior large-firm management experience is similar to the 
effect of university education – longer to reach a resolution in either direction (becoming 
operational or terminating). This raises the suspicion that founders with this type of education 
and/or experience may find it harder than others to find the ‘fast and frugal’ ways to get 
things done that some entrepreneurs allegedly excel at, i.e., that some ‘unlearning’ (Akgün, 
Lynn, & Byrne, 2006) would serve them well in order to reach more success as business 
founders. This, however, is an admittedly speculative interpretation of the results.   
In all, the most important result reported in Table 9 is the relatively strong, positive 
effect of industry experience. We must caution, though, that this effect has not been found 
consistently in similar research in other countries (Davidsson & Gordon, 2009). Important is 
also the lack of very strong effects of prior start-up experience. Both founders and those who 
invest in their ventures should be aware that prior experience is not a strong predictor of the 
success chances of the current start-up. 
Human Resources V: Some additional indicators. Table 10 reports the results for 
some further indicators of the human resources available to the emerging venture. We first 
caution that the reported measures are self-assessments and that the ‘Applies to %’ column 
suggests they may be somewhat inflated. In retrospect there would have been reason to probe 
more deeply into the quality of these alleged competencies and contributions. It is difficult to 
suggest any meaningful interpretation of the results for specific functional knowledge other 
than perhaps for the largely positive effects ascribed to more industry-specific competencies 
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related to product/service development and production/delivery – yet these do not stand in the 
multivariate test.  
The most significant observation to be made from the analysis in Table 10 is the 
importance of already having potential customers identified when the start-up process 
commences. In addition, although self-reported business reputation may not be a highly 
reliable measure, this variable seems to reflect the importance of so called legitimacy, which 
is emphasized in the research literature (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Delmar & Shane, 2004; 
Honig & Karlsson, 2004; Suchman, 1995). A comparison of this result with results reported 
earlier suggests such legitimacy does not follow automatically from, for example, previous 
involvement in business start-ups. 
The absence of effects for any of the last three variables related to the use of outside 
helpers is surprising. A general conclusion from various types of research over the last few 
decades is that successful entrepreneurs – rather than trying to be omnipotent lone wolfs –  
are individuals with social capital and social skills which allows them to identify, cultivate 
and use the competence of others, be it partners, employees, board members, consultants or 
holders of other roles in relation to the business (Baron & Markman, 2000; Davidsson & 
Honig, 2003). This does not come through clearly in the CAUSEE data with respect to 
randomly selected nascent firms at early stages and with respect to the type of outcomes we 
focus on here. Use of non-owner helpers indicates the existence of some free labour and 
advice, usually probably meaning friends and family members giving a hand. Number of 
functional areas covered by non-owner helpers indicates contribution in the same type of 
functional areas as previously analysed for the founders themselves in the first few rows of 
Table 10. Neither of these variables are ascribed any discernable effects, and in Table 6 we 
saw that the same applies to numbers of hours contributed by these non-owner helpers.  
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Table 10. Outcome effects of some additional human resource indicators  
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to  
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Non-negligible competence 
from either education or 
experience represented on 
the team in: 
    
- Selling/Marketing 88 – – – –  none none 
- Accounting/Finance 65 none – – –  none 
- HRM/Administration 65 +++ none none 
- Product/service 
development in industry 
69 none none ++ 
- Production or service 
delivery in industry 
68 ++ none ++ 
Founders provided the 
venture with: 
    
- Prior customer contact 81 ++ ++++ none 
- Prior supplier contact 64 ++ + none 
- Unique product/service 
knowledge 
77 ++ none ++ 
- Access to funding 16 none none none 
- Excellent business 
reputation 
74 ++ none ++++ 
Other     
Use of non-owner helpers 
(yes/no) 
37 none none none 
No. of functional areas 
covered by non-owner 
helpers  
N/A none none none 
No. of person sources of 
business advice 
N/A none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
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Even more surprisingly, we find no effect for the use of advisors as indicated by 
Number of personal sources of business advice. This is summed across such sources as 
family members; friends and colleagues; board members; bank staff; potential customers and 
suppliers; accountant; lawyer; government or non-government support agencies, tax 
consultants, and other types of commercial consultants. As can be seen, the mere number of 
sources used has no bearing on outcomes.  
When we examine use of individual sources the strongest positive association with 
getting operational occurs for using the accountant as a major source of business advice. 
Among those who indicate such use at the time of the first interview, 54 percent had become 
operational 12 months later, while the corresponding figure for others stays at 38 percent. 
However, this effect is not verified in the multivariate analysis.   
To round up this extensive section on the role of human resources – that is, the 
knowledge, skills, contacts, etc. that the founders and others involved contribute to the start-
up – we think the following is worth emphasising: 
• The work effort itself – the number of hours invested in the start-up – is a very 
important determinant of outcomes. There is some indication in previous research that 
some founders – notably portfolio entrepreneurs – develop an ability to achieve  more 
with less effort (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998), but generally there is no escape from 
putting in the hard work. It is important to note that the hours invested is strongly 
related to getting the venture operational and not just to reaching a ‘conclusive’ 
outcome in either direction.  
• While most research indicates that team start-ups perform better our results indicate 
that at this very early stage being a team rather than solo start-up has a negative 
impact in the ‘Operational vs. Terminated’ outcome contrast analysis. 
• We find no noteworthy outcome differences by the sex of the founders.  
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• While immigrants are neither more nor less successful we find that founders of non-
European ethnic background as a group have less successful outcomes. 
•  We find relatively little systematic effect of the level and contents of the education of 
the founders. There is some suggestion that more education is associated with taking 
longer time in the start-up process.  
• With respect to reaching a successful outcome, experience seems more important than 
education. In particular work experience from the start-up’s industry – and what 
comes with such experience – seems important. One particularly important aspect of 
prior industry experience may be to have potential customers lined up from a very 
early stage. 
• While there is no general, positive effect of prior start-up experience our data suggest 
prior start-up success and – perhaps even more – already having established a good 
reputation in the business community – are predictive of more positive outcomes.  
• Compared to previous research we find surprisingly little evidence that skill at using 
other people’s competence is important for reaching favourable entrepreneurial 
outcomes. 
 
Money talks – or does it? It may seem patently obvious that the amount of financial 
capital available to and used by a business start-up should have a strong and positive effect on 
outcomes. However, the main finding from similar, previous international research is a 
surprising lack of effects, or only finding weak effects, of financial capital indicators. There 
are three likely reasons for this somewhat surprising state of affairs.  
1. The founders are not trying to start identical firms. On the contrary, they are working 
on very different start-ups that require different amounts of funding in order to get to 
an operational state. 
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2. Some financial variables that have been used – like the founders’ household wealth – 
indicate capital availability but not actual investments made in the start-up. 
3. Some entrepreneurs apply fast and frugal strategies to achieve a lot with very small 
means, and conversely there is no upper limit to the amount of resources that can be 
used to achieve nothing if they are not spent wisely. 
Against this background, Table 11 presents some results for the outcome effects of 
financial capital. A first, overall impression is that we do find effects – and mostly in the 
expected directions. However, none of the variables reported in this table show consistently 
strong effects. Arguably, the overall conclusion should be that as determinant of the 
outcomes of most start-up processes, financial capital is a less central matter than most 
people would think. It is also noteworthy that these financial indicators have almost no ability 
to discriminate between terminated cases and those still trying; a lack of effect that will be 
further emphasised in later analyses (as will be explained below the last two variables in the 
table are not direct measures of financial capital but indicate reduced need for such capital).  
This said, we find the expected positive influence of the dollar amount (log) invested on 
the probability of getting up and running, although this does not hold true in competition with 
other variables. Ratio dollars invested to expected sales volume (log) is an approximation of 
the size of investments made so far as a proportion of the total investment needed in order to 
create a business of the scale intended by the founders. The bivariate result is a 
counterintuitive negative effect in the first two analyses; however the effect turns positive in 
the ‘Operational vs. Terminated’ case in the multivariate formulation. It is hard to draw any 
conclusions based on this. Perhaps the measure is too much of an approximation to be useful.  
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Table 11. Outcome effects of financial capital investments and needs  
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Dollars invested ++ + none 
Ratio dollars invested to 
expected sales volume 
+++ – –  none 
Founder owns their own 
home (70% ‘yes’) 
++++ +++ none 
Founder owns investment 
property (24% ‘yes’) 
none none none 
Use of ‘Bricolage’ none – –  ++++ 
Venture idea’s 
relatedness to resources 
already at hand 
none ++ – –  
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
As previously explained CAUSEE applies a venture or firm level perspective rather 
than focusing on the individual founder. Therefore, the interviews did not even cover the 
household wealth of the respondents because for team start-ups the relevant wealth would be 
that of all founders combined, and the respondent would likely not be willing or able to report 
on that matter. However, we do have a simple indicator (for the respondent only): Founder 
owns their own home. Considering that this measure does not include property owned by 
founders other than the respondent and in light of weak results for household wealth in 
previous research it is somewhat surprising to find a clear positive association between home 
ownership and getting the start-up operational. This may reflect particularities of Australian 
conditions. There are two likely reasons for this effect: a) it signals that the founder has a 
better financial situation generally and thus more means to invest in the start-up, and b) it 
shows the founder has collateral which can be used to obtain loans for the purpose of getting 
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the business going. Founder owns investment property is a second wealth indicator. We find 
no effects for this variable, possibly because of effects that cancel out. On the one hand 
investment properties are indicative of wealth; on the other hand they constitute a form of 
investment that competes with the start-up for the founder’s total investment capacity.  
 The notion of Bricolage has recently attracted considerable attention in 
entrepreneurship research, not least through Baker and Nelson’s (2005) article “Creating 
something from nothing: Resource construction through entrepreneurial bricolage.” This 
title also reveals what bricolage stands for. Partly overlapping the notion of financial 
bootstrapping (Winborg & Landström, 2001) it is not a measure of financial capital per se, 
but of actions that reduce the need for money to achieve something. According to Baker and 
Nelson (2005) there are at least three components to bricolage: a) making do – using existing 
resources and seeking solutions that are simple and workable rather than ‘perfect’; b) new 
uses of resources – using inputs for other than their original purpose, often amounting to 
getting value out of what others would not regard as resources at all, and c) applying new 
combinations of resources in order to achieve results.     
 Assessing the use of bricolage is not an easy task and there exist no established ways 
of measuring it in a systematic fashion that can be applied in survey research. Therefore, 
CAUSEE has pioneered the development of such a measure, which according to our 
preliminary assessment does constitute a valid reflection of actual bricolage behaviours. The 
measure consists of the summed score across nine statements to which the respondent gives 
answers on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘always’. To use a summed index across 
several items is standard procedure in order to cover the ground and reduce random errors 
when trying to gauge this type of hard-to-measure construct. To get a sense of the measure, 
two of the statements are “We combine resources to accomplish new challenges that the 
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resources weren’t originally intended to accomplish” and “When dealing with new problems 
or opportunities we take action by assuming that we will find a workable solution.” 
 The result in Table 11 indicates that using bricolage is associated with prolonging the 
process. That is, using this creative and frugal type of approach may make the venture no 
more or less likely to end in termination or operational status eventually, but those pursuing it 
should expect it to take somewhat longer to reach a resolution. However, one could also 
argue that since the effect is stronger and holds up in a multivariate test in the last but not the 
middle analysis in Table 11 there is some indication that the use of bricolage is associated 
with more positive outcomes. Specifically, applying a ‘bricolage’ approach may lessen the 
risk of termination because of reduced financial exposure. 
 The opposite pattern of effects emerges for the last variable in Table 11, Venture 
idea’s relatedness to resources already at hand. Like bricolage, this is an indicator of 
reduced need for financial capital rather than being a direct measure of such capital. The 
result is not evidence that those who start ventures for which they already have many of the 
requisite resources at hand will be more or less successful, but it does indicate that they can 
expect to reach an outcome sooner. However, this is not repeated as an independent effect in 
the multivariate case. 
 Another section of the interview addressed what kind of funding sources have been 
used at all (at the time of the first interview) and which had been used as a major source of 
funding, meaning 20 percent or more of total funding needs. Table 12 displays results based 
on these questions. The low percentages for many types of funding in the ‘Applies to %’ 
column may come as a surprise and reminds us about the very early stage and often modest 
nature of many of these start-ups. 
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Table 12. Outcome effects of use of different types of funding  
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to  
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
At the time of the 1st interview 
the start-up has used… 
    
Founders savings, at all 87 none none none 
Founders savings, major 72 none none none 
Founders credit card debt, at 
all 
45 ++++ ++++ none 
Founders credit card debt, 
major 
21 + none none 
Funds from other business 
owned by founders, at all 
15 none none none 
Funds from other business 
owned by founders, major 
9 none none none 
Loans from family, friends & 
other acquaintances, at all 
16 none none none 
Loans from family, friends & 
other acquaintances, major 
5 none none none 
Bank loans, at all 27 ++ ++ none 
Bank loans, major 16 ++++ ++++ none 
Equity from family, friends & 
other acquaintances, at all 
4 none none none 
Equity from family, friends & 
other acquaintances, major 
2 none none none 
Equity from any other external 
sources, at all 
4 none none none 
Equity from any other external 
sources, major 
4 none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
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The results are interesting and very clear. First, there is no association at all between 
use of funding sources and ‘Terminated vs. Still Trying’, re-enforcing a pattern we saw in 
Table 11. Second, those who use credit card debt and those that use bank loans are 
significantly more likely to reach an operational stage. Because of low numbers we have 
combined different types of secured and unsecured loans to the founders or to the business 
itself. The results are very similar for using bank loans ‘at all’ or using it as a ‘major’ source 
of funding, but the latter comes out slightly stronger in the multivariate analysis (because 
they overlap, ‘at all’ and ‘major’ versions of the same funding source should not both be 
expected to be retained in the multivariate analysis).  
The size of these effects is quite substantial. To illustrate its magnitude, we note that for 
the minority that have used bank loans as a major source of funding (16 percent of the cases), 
the proportions being operational and terminated are 65 and 16 percent, respectively. Among 
the majority that had not used bank loans at all at the time of the first interview the 
corresponding percentages are 36 and 31 percent, respectively. That is, roughly speaking 
using bank loans as a major funding source is associated with doubling the likelihood of now 
being operational and halving the risk of being terminated. We should caution, however, that 
reverse causality may underlie all or most of this effect because those who simply are further 
into the start-up process are more likely to seek and/or get bank loans. 
We should also mention that an absence of findings for funding sources that are used by 
nearly all (like personal savings) or very few (like external equity) may still be important 
factors but fail to yield statistically significant effects because the skewed proportions make 
the estimated effects less certain. However, a closer examination of our results (not reported) 
does not indicate that this is a main reason for not identifying an impact of some sources. We 
also note that the effect of bank loans is not a simple reflection of the fact that some have 
collateral to base a bank loan on, and some do not (cf. home ownership in Table 11). We 
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tested this by entering both into the same logistic regression analysis. Founders’ home 
ownership and use of bank loans are ascribed separate, positive influence on getting 
operational. All in all, the lesson seems clear: taking on some debt is often a prerequisite for 
getting the start-up operational (within reasonable time). Some use of credit card debt in 
combination with substantial bank loans seems to be an effective way of helping the business 
get up and running.   
Summing up our results regarding the role of financial capital we find that: 
• The dollar amount invested has a small role in determining the outcomes achieved 
so far; probably far less than most people would think. 
• Those who use credit card debt to some extent and those who take on bank loans, are 
more likely to get their start-up operational. 
• The same is true for those who own their own home and this seems to reflect more 
than just the availability of collateral on which to base bank loans. 
• Strategies to reduce the need for financial capital such as ‘bricolage’ or choosing a 
venture idea that leverages resources already at hand influences the length of the 
start-up process (increasing and decreasing it, respectively) but not necessarily the 
ultimate outcome. 
 Resource advantages and disadvantages. The final area of analysis pertaining to 
resources concerns the venture’s resource advantages and disadvantages relative to 
competitors, as perceived and reported by the founders. Here we are dealing with the central 
theme in the currently dominating theory of business strategy, the so called Resource-based 
View (Barney, 1991), which argues that firms reach superior performance by identifying, 
cultivating, exploiting and defending advantages intrinsic to their unique resource bundles. 
As some of the resource (dis-)advantages concern knowledge resources there is an admitted 
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degree of overlap between the issues covered here and those reported above as Human 
Resources. 
Table 13 summarises the results. The first seven variables are multiple-item summated 
variables based on agree-disagree statements relating to the variables as labelled. The last two 
variables are multiple-item summated variables of a different kind, which try to assess how 
easy or difficult it would be for competitors to imitate the (emerging) firm’s most important 
resource advantage and, conversely, how easy or difficult it would be for the start-up to 
overcome its most important resource disadvantage relative to competitors. 
Table 13. Outcome effects of perceived resource advantages and disadvantages 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Resource advantage in 
terms of… 
none none none 
- Marketing expertise none none ++ 
- Technical expertise none none none 
- Cost structure none none none 
- Flexibility none none none 
- Opportunity alertness +++ +++ ++ 
- Networking + none none 
- Product/Service 
uniqueness/differentiation 
none none none 
Inimitability Advantage ++ none ++++ 
Imitability Disadvantage none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
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What is immediately apparent is that not many strong effects emerge. This may mean 
that these resource advantages, which are purported by the resource-based view to create 
competitive advantage for established firms, are relatively less important for determining the 
early start-up outcomes analysed here. 
Arguably, the most important result in Table 13 is the negative effect of Inimitability 
advantage on termination. This reflects a perception by the interviewed founder that the start-
up has some unique edge, which competitors would have a hard time trying to imitate. The 
negative effect on Terminated vs. Still Trying suggests founders who perceive such an 
advantage are less prone to give up, which is understandable. The positive effect on 
Operational vs. Terminated might mean that those founders are also eager to reach the market 
sooner, presumably in order to capture any ‘first mover advantages’ (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). However, this does not hold up as an independent effect in the 
multivariate test.  
Also worth commenting on is the positive, albeit weak, effect of Opportunity alertness. 
Behind this concept we find agreement with statements such as (our) “knowledge of the latest 
industry trends” (is superior to that of competitors) and similar for “technological trends” and 
“what leading customers are asking for.” Again, we may be seeing a reflection of the 
importance of industry experience.  
 
Results Relating to the Process Itself 
 Triggers of the start-up process. As previously mentioned one of the strengths of the 
CAUSEE research is that it follows start-ups over time through repeated data collection. This 
allows investigating process issues more deeply and credibly. The most important process 
contents are questions recording the initiation or completion of over 30 ‘gestation activities’ 
such as seeking finance; writing a business plan; buying inputs; joining business associations; 
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seeking advice, and hiring employees. In each round of interviewing the respondents are 
asked whether previously not initiated/completed activities have now been 
initiated/completed. If such is the case, they are also asked in what year and month this 
occurred.  
The gestation activity variables will form the backbone of this section of our report. 
However, we will start with a few questions regarding how and why the start-up process was 
initiated in the first place. These results are displayed in Table 14. The quick summary of 
these results is that how and why the process originated does not have much influence on the 
type of outcomes we are analysing in this report. The first two variables in the table refer to 
two alternative venture creation origins as identified by Bhave (1994). The first is the more 
textbook-like process where individuals first decide they want to go into business for 
themselves, then identify and evaluate several possible business ideas before selecting one of 
them, which they then refine and implement. The second type of process – which our and 
related research (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008) indicate is much more frequent – starts with a 
solution to a personal, often work- or hobby-related problem or opportunity, which is later 
generalised to becoming a business idea. In this latter case there is no consideration of 
alternative opportunities; it is either about creating a venture around this idea or none at all. 
The results suggest those using processes triggered by the desire to start a firm have 
slightly ‘worse’ performance on average; a result that only appears in the multivariate 
analysis. This may perhaps seem a bit surprising. However, there are at least two plausible 
explanations. First, these founders may be more prone to give up on a particular idea in order 
to pursue another one. After all, they are driven by a wish to start a business and are not 
restricted to one particular idea only. Second, it may be the case that people without a prior 
strong desire to start a business are more discerning and the average inherent quality of the 
business idea needs to be higher to motivate them to pursue it. 
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Table 14. Outcome effects of type of process initiation 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Applies 
to  
% 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Process triggered by a 
wish to start one’s own 
firm 
16 – – –  none – – –  
Process triggered by the 
specific idea 
48 none none none 
Process initiated because 
of opportunity (‘pull’ 
rather than ‘push’) 
74 none none none 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
It is known from the Australian participation in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(Hindle & O'Conner, 2006) that a majority of Australian business founders are opportunity-
motivated rather than driven to business foundation out of necessity. With 74 percent 
claiming ‘pure’ opportunity (or ‘pull’) motivation, our data confirm this. However, the results 
suggest the type of initial trigger is inconsequential for the outcomes we are analysing. This is 
of some importance as it might otherwise be suspected that those who are pushed into self-
employment for lack of alternatives would be less equipped for the task.     
Activities in the process. To assess the exact starting point of a business creation 
process is not a trivial task (Reynolds, 2007). As noted above, the process may start with an 
individual solving a personal problem and activities that in fact move the process towards a 
business start-up would not be conceived of as ‘business start-up activities’ at the time. In 
addition, one or two activities may be undertaken at one point in time and the process may 
then be dormant for a long period until something triggers its resumption. Acknowledging 
this, the first variable in Table 15 is simply the (logarithm of) the number of months passed 
since completion of the first gestation activity, whatever activity that was. Measured this way 
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the result is a simple but important lesson for business founders, especially when contrasted 
with the results for the other variables in the table: the passing of time in itself does 
absolutely nothing to get a business operational (or to reach a termination decision, for that 
matter). Rather, it is action that counts.    
The importance of action is clearly demonstrated by the results for the other two 
variables in Table 15. The first of these two, Number of gestation activities already 
completed at first interview, explains more of the outcome variance than anything else 
covered in this report. This may be viewed as a trivial finding: those that were caught later in 
the process when first entering into this research are now more likely to be up and running. 
This is precisely why we have included this variable as a control variable in previous 
analyses. 
Table 15. Outcome effects of time and completion of gestation activities 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Time since first gestation 
activity (at first interview) 
none none none 
No. of gestation activities 
already completed at first 
interview 
++++ ++++ ++++ 
No. of gestation activities 
completed between first and 
second interview 
++++ ++++ ++++ 
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
 
However, two aspects of this result are worth considering beyond regarding this rather 
obvious relationship as appearing more or less by definition. The first is the contrast to just 
using time in the start-up process as indicator of how far proceeded they were when first 
captured by our survey; we just saw that time alone has no bearing on outcomes. The second 
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is the strong negative relationship with termination (i.e., positive effect in the last column). 
Completing more activities does not just lead to a resolution in either direction; it specifically 
increases the likelihood of getting the venture to an operational stage. 
This pattern is repeated for Number of gestation activities completed between first and 
second interview. Completing more activities is strongly and positively associated with 
getting operational and negatively associated with termination. To illustrate the size of the 
effect, we may start by noting that without using any predictor variable one can correctly 
classify 64 percent of the cases in the Operational vs. Terminated contrast (by ‘guessing’ that 
they are all operational). Entering Number of gestation activities already completed at first 
interview and the seven venture characteristic control variables into the equation increases the 
rate of correct classification to 74 percent. Thereafter adding Number of gestation activities 
completed between first and second interview further increases the precision to 81 percent. In 
the Terminated vs. Still Trying analysis the corresponding percentages are 52, 65, and 70 
percent, respectively. These are very sizeable effects; other ‘strong’ effects discussed in this 
report typically increase the classification correctness rate by 1-3 percentage points. Of all the 
variables studied in this report, only Hours of work invested by owners in the last 12 months 
(see Table 6) is more influential.  
Apart from the number of activities completed, how their completion unfolds over time 
may be important. We will not here examine the effects of the sequencing of specific 
activities. Among researchers who have tried that some argue they find systematic effects of 
sequencing (Delmar & Shane, 2003, 2004) while others find no common order in the 
sequencing of activities (Liao & Welsch, 2002, 2003). We will instead follow the example of 
Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley and Gartner (2007) and centre on patterns of activity over time, 
without regard to which specific activities occur at what time. Table 16 reports results for 
three such measures: timing, which assesses whether more activities tend to be completed 
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early or late in the process; rate, which is the number of activities completed per time unit, 
and concentration, which is the tendency for activity completion to cluster at particular points 
in time rather than being evenly distributed over the process.  
Because of interdependencies among these measures it is challenging to tease out their 
individual effects. This is why after trying several different analysis approaches we list some 
effects as ‘indeterminate’ in Table 16. The most reliable and also most important effect 
displayed here is arguably the negative effect of concentration. It appears that those founders 
who have a more evenly paced process rather than spurts of concentrated activity are more 
likely to get to an operational stage, and somewhat less likely to terminate. The results for 
Timing suggest that any unevenness in the intensity of the process should be towards greater 
intensity early in the process, perhaps to get past some threshold in order to feel that the start-
up is really under way and not just a distant dream. Overall, it seems that process dynamics 
are important. However, these results must be regarded as tentative especially as they do not 
fully align with what Lichtenstein et al. (2007) previously concluded on the basis of 
analysing data from a US sample. 
Table 16. Outcome effects of process patterns 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Process activity timing (late 
vs. early) 
– – –  none – – – 
Process activity rate (No. of 
activities per time unit)  
indeterminate ++ – – 
Process activity 
concentration (high vs. low) 
– – – –  + – – –  
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. 
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Another set of questions cover the dynamism of the project in terms of the number of 
changes made to the venture idea as well as the reasons for these changes. We do not report 
these in any table for the simple reason that very few links to outcomes emerge. There is one 
exception, though. Changes on the customer side have positive associations with getting 
operational. This is evident to some extent for changes occurring because customers 
requested them and for change in the selection of target (type of) customers. In particular, 
those who have experienced success with a customer and as a consequence of that success 
refocussed their effort are more likely to have become operational. This points at the need for 
some adaptability in the early stages of venture development. What the founders initially 
imagined may not work as conceived, but something related that was not conceived of may 
be encountered along the way, and this somewhat unexpectedly encountered revelation may 
become the basis for future success. While not all are lucky enough to come across such 
opportunities for fruitful reorientation this result suggests it is important for business founders 
to be open to such possibilities rather than early locking into a firmly pre-determined path. 
We now turn to possible effects of having completed specific activities. In doing so, we 
refrain completely from bivariate analyses – the simple association between activities 
considered one-by-one on the one hand, and outcome status on the other. Such an exercise 
would not be very illuminating because the closer a case is to becoming operational, the more 
likely it is that it has completed each of these activities. Instead, we look only at any residual 
effect after already having considered the following, expanded set of control variables: 
Number of gestation activities already completed at the first interview; Number of gestation 
activities completed between first and second interview; Hours of work invested by owners in 
the last 12 months, and the seven venture type control variables Retailing, Brick-and-Mortar-
Only, Hitech, Growth Focus, Non-local Sales, Product Focus and Newness. Arguably, if a 
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gestation activity is ascribed an independent effect after controlling for all of these there is 
reason to take it seriously.          
Not surprisingly, after these rigorous controls many gestation activities appear to be 
individually inconsequential to the outcome status of the start-up in all three outcome 
contrasts. Table 17 lists these gestation activities. 
Table 17. Gestation activities that individually do not contribute predicting 
outcome status 
• Deciding on a location 
• Deciding on legal form 
• Retaining an accountant 
• Starting marketing efforts 
• Seeking IP protection 
• Seeking external funding 
• Establishing supplier credit 
• Defining market opportunities 
• Making financial projections 
• Joining a face-to-face business network 
• Taking start-up related classes; seminars 
• Registering for GST or PAYG 
• Opening a separate bank account 
• Making the business contactable via 
phone and email 
• Creating a website 
 
Table 18 lists the ascribed effects of the remaining 20 gestation activities covered by 
the research. An examination of the results suggests that many of these associations, while 
‘statistically significant’, do not necessarily represent causal effects. Some may reflect 
actions that have occurred as a consequence of reaching an operational stage rather than 
contributing to reaching that state. This could apply to, e.g., registering the business’ name; 
buying liability insurance, registering for ABN and perhaps for joining a trade organisation. 
To tease out the causal direction would at a minimum require a close inspection of the timing 
of the activities and the event of becoming operational, respectively, which we have not done 
for this report.   
In other cases, the activities represent something that is (close to) a logical necessity for 
being operational. For example, in order to have regular revenue one has to have a product or 
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service that is ready for sale, and buying equipment and inputs would often also be 
requirements of this nature. This said it is worth emphasising that founders should focus on 
getting their market offer ready for sale; many other activities are relatively less important. 
Likewise, they need at some time to dare to take the leap and invest in equipment, facilities 
and inputs; otherwise the start-up will remain a dream.  
Some unexpected negative associations with getting operational may reflect the varying 
nature of the start-ups. Despite our extensive controls for venture type, the possibility cannot 
be excluded that the effects ascribed to formalising an ownership agreement; developing 
proprietary technology and retaining a lawyer are due to these characteristics being 
associated with more complex and higher ambition ventures that take longer to get to market. 
Similarly, the negative results for determined regulatory requirements probably reflect the 
effects of having to comply with such requirements rather than of the act of investigating 
what they are. However, it should not be ruled out that these negative effects to some extent 
also reflect a tendency to focus on the ‘wrong things’, such as perfecting technology beyond 
what the market needs or to overly emphasise problems and risks at the expense of paying 
due attention to opportunities and potential customers.  
Turning to positive results, we noted above that we have found surprisingly little 
support in this report so far for the importance of working with and through other people. In 
Table 18 we find some such support for the value of using other people’s competence (and 
resources) in the effects of joining Internet communities and trade associations, and perhaps 
in particular in the effect on initiating collaborative agreements with other organisations, 
which is strong in the Operational vs. Still Trying contrast.  
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Table 18. Outcome effects ascribed to individual gestation activities 
Outcome  
Contrast 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
Registering the business name +++ ++++  
Formalising an ownership agreement – – – –    
Completing development of 
product/service (ready to sell) 
++++ ++++  
Developing proprietary technology – – –    
Bought/leased major equipment or 
facilities 
 ++++  
Purchased inputs ++++  ++++ 
Collected competitor information  – – – –   
Determined the regulatory 
requirements 
– – – –  – – – –   
Bought liability insurance +++   
Registered for ABN  ++++  
Prepared a business plan – – – –   – – –  
Upgraded to more formalised 
business plan 
– – – –  – – – –   
Revised the business plan (contents)  – – – –  ++++ 
Received external funding +++  +++ 
Hired employee(s)  +++  
Retained a lawyer – – – –  – – – –   
Joined a trade association ++++  ++++ 
Contacted a support agency 
(Governmental or NGO) 
– – – –  – – –   
Joined relevant Internet community +++   
Initiated collaborative agreement 
with other organisation 
+++ ++++  
Note: The entries combine results from bivariate and multivariate analyses as explained in the Method section. 
See Table 3 (p. 17) for an explanation of symbols used. For reasons explained in the body text no bivariate 
results are reported, which is why absence of a multivariate effect is displayed as blank rather than ‘none’. 
 
 
The central role business plans and business planning have in entrepreneurship teaching 
and counselling as well as in external funding decisions suggest there is widespread belief 
that business planning is an important ingredient in successful venture creation. The ubiquity 
of business plan competitions also contributes to this image. Our results for the business 
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planning variables – which are among the strongest results reported in Table 18 – question 
this conventional wisdom, thereby possibly making them the most provocative findings 
discussed in this report. We will therefore elaborate on this important, complicated and 
somewhat controversial issue in a separate section below. For now, we offer the tentative 
conclusion that while our results do not prove that any use of business planning is detrimental 
to start-up performance they are strong and clear enough to suggest that regardless of one’s 
prior belief on the matter there is reason to seriously consider the possibility that business 
planning can be counter-productive – and perhaps even that this might occur quite often.  
Also perhaps controversial is also the negative association between contact with 
support agencies and getting operational. There are several possible explanations for this that 
do not amount to throwing a shadow on the assistance provided by such agencies. Firstly, we 
have the possibility of negative self-selection; assistance may be sought by founders in more 
need of assistance to begin with. Our multivariate analysis does not control for this possibility 
to the same extent as it controls for venture type. However, separate analyses (not reported 
here) do not suggest any strong relationships between agency contact and what would 
constitute either a lack of relevant experience or expertise on the part of the team or 
indicators of a high ambition/high sophistication venture. Another possibility is that these 
agencies legitimately help start-up efforts that should be terminated to reach that conclusion, 
or to avoid rushing to market prematurely when doing so may be detrimental to long term 
performance. However, our strongly positive results for indicators of effort and action in 
combination with our pending question mark for the value of planning also point at another 
possibility that needs to be seriously considered: that support activities gear too much 
attention towards planning, and too little towards concrete action and adaptability, which is 
what our analysis of process issues have suggested drive positive outcomes. The same could 
be a possible reason for the non-effect of taking classes and seminars as reported in Table 17. 
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 The role of business planning. As already mentioned, business plans and business 
planning have a major role in entrepreneurship teaching and counselling as well as in 
evaluations of ventures by external partners for funding decisions and business plan 
competitions. However, the research evidence on the merits of business planning is 
inconclusive. An early so called meta-analysis – a systematic re-analysis of results reported in 
a number of studies – concluded that there is a small but positive association between 
planning and performance in small firms (Schwenk & Shrader, 1993). This is in line with 
what the majority of subsequent studies indicates, and it has also been confirmed for 
Australian Small and Medium-sized firms (SMEs) by Gibson and Cassar (2005), although 
these authors question the causal nature of this relationship. However, this positive 
association in prior literature concerns established SMEs and not start-ups. Arguably, the 
high degree of uncertainty that signifies the start-up situation may alter the effects of plans 
and planning. In a comprehensive review of previous research similar to ours – that is, 
focusing on nascent firms and the type of outcomes we are dealing with in this report – 
Davidsson and Gordon (2009) found some support, albeit not very consistent, for a positive 
association between planning and persistence (i.e., reduced probability of termination), but no 
direct evidence for either a positive or negative effect on measures of venture success. They 
also argued that future research should look more deeply into the issue and not confine the 
analysis to a simple comparison of the existence vs. non-existence of a business plan. 
The relationships between various aspects of planning and outcomes are complex and 
intricate. Hence, below we report the results of more complex analyses to unpack the nuances 
of these influences. Table 19 displays the results of four multiple logistic regression analyses 
much in the same way the results would be reported in a scholarly journal. We use the same 
three performance contrasts as in analyses reported previously. In order to rule out that our 
conclusions are completely driven by some peculiarity of using these performance contrasts 
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we have added a fourth, more ‘conventional’ analysis where those firms that do not only have 
regular sales but regularly experience that revenue covers all costs (19 percent of the cases) 
are contrasted with cases representing all other known outcomes.  
We also use the same (expanded set of) controls for venture stage of development and 
venture type that we have used in previous analyses. Towards the bottom of the table we 
report two overall measures of the predictive success of the analyses, Nagelkerke R2 and 
Percent correctly classified. These measures can vary between 0 and 1, and 0 and 100, 
respectively – a higher number indicating a better model fit to the data. The overall results 
reported in Table 19 are satisfactory for this type of data, with the first analysis being 
particularly successful.  
The key information in the table is the numerical regression coefficients reported in the 
columns. The direction of the influence is given by the sign of the coefficient, directly 
comparable to our reporting of pluses and minuses in previous tables. The strength of the 
influence is given by the magnitude of the coefficient. This magnitude is scale dependent, 
meaning that coefficient magnitude can only be directly compared for variables sharing the 
same measurement scale. 
Thus, the two ‘numbers of activities’ variables can be compared with each other but not 
with coefficients of other variables. All venture type and business planning variables except 
Newness and Non-local Sales Aspirations are assessed in a binary yes/no fashion, and their 
coefficients can thus be internally compared. Finally, the statistical significance – or degree 
of certainty – is influenced by the strength of the effect but also by sample size and the 
variable’s variance, among other things. Significance is comparable across all variables. See 
the table note for clarification on the symbols for statistical significance.   
 
  
56 
 
Table 19. Outcome effects ascribed to business planning activities  
Outcome  
Contrast 
 
Outcome Driver 
Operational 
 vs.  
Terminated 
(n=337) 
Operational  
vs.  
Still Trying 
(n=365) 
Still Trying  
vs. 
Terminated 
(n=288) 
Pos. Cash Flow  
vs.  
All Other 
(n=487)  
Effort and dev.  stage 
controls 
    
No. of activities  completed 
at 1st interview 
.211 *** .161 *** .049 # .158 *** 
No. of activities completed 
between 1st and 2nd 
interview 
.321 *** .134 ** .134 ** .128 ** 
Hours of work invested by 
owners in last 12 months 
.001 *** .000 n.s. .000 # .000 n.s. 
Venture type controls     
Retailing .433 n.s. .902 ** -.410 n.s. 1.057 ** 
Product Focus -.169 n.s. -.251 n.s. -.133 n.s. -1.096 *** 
Brick-and-Mortar-Only .754 * .547 * -.176 n.s. .865 *** 
Hitech -.347 n.s. -.573 * .308 n.s. -.530 # 
Newness -.015 n.s. -.092 # .071 n.s. -.128 * 
Growth Focus -.316 n.s. -.694 * .232 n.s. -.939 ** 
Non-local Sales Aspirations .003 n.s. -.008 * .003 n.s. -.006 n.s. 
Business Planning variables     
Unwritten plan at 1st 
interview 
-.263 n.s. .035 n.s. -.653 n.s. -1.239 * 
Informal, written plan at 1st 
interview 
-1.212 ** -.214 n.s. -.928 * -.960 ** 
Formal, written plan at 1st 
interview 
-1.199 * -.494 n.s. -1.072 * -1.381 *** 
Upgrade to more formal plan 
between 1st and 2nd int. 
-1.559 * -1.051 * -.176 n.s. -.543 n.s. 
Revision of plan contents 
between 1st and 2nd int. 
.728 # -.515 n.s. 1.318 *** .680 * 
Use emphasis = action plan -2.597 * -.907 n.s. .315 n.s. -1.435 n.s. 
Nagelkerke R2 .61 .34 .30 .36 
Percent correctly classified 85 73 70 79 
Note: The symbols #, *, ** and *** indicate that the result is statistically significant at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 
percent risk levels (two-tailed), respectively; a lower risk level meaning a statistically less uncertain result. 
Similarly, ‘n.s.’ means ‘not significant’, suggesting a risk of more than 10 percent that a corresponding effect in 
the indicated direction may actually be non-existent in the population from which the sample was drawn. The 
number of cases included in each performance contrast is indicated by ‘n=xxx’.   
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With this introduction we can now turn to the actual results. We then find that number 
of activities completed stands out as important in all analyses while hours invested is ascribed 
a strong, independent effect only in the first analysis. It is also clear that the venture type 
control variables stand out as important in the contrast of Operational vs. Still Trying and 
Positive Cash Flow vs. All Other Outcomes, but not very much in the other two analyses. 
Our focal variables, of course, are the business plan variables in the bottom half of the 
table. The first three of these – Unwritten, Informal, and Formal – denote the status of the 
business plan at the first interview. These are dummy variables with comparison to the fourth 
category; those that reported having no business plan of any shape or form. The next two 
variables concern changes of the business plan from the first to the second interview point. 
Upgrade indicates increased formalization (from non to unwritten; unwritten to informally 
written; or informally written to formally prepared). Revision instead reflects whether the 
contents of the business plan have been changed, arguably reflecting some form of strategic 
re-orientation of the venture. The last variable indicates the use of the business plan that the 
respondent reported as the most important over the last 12 months. We probed into four 
possible uses: a) As an action plan that you follow step by step; b) As a means to try to obtain 
external funding and other benefits from others; c) As a means of thinking things through in 
order to seize opportunities and avoid mistakes, and d) As a tool for communicating strategic 
actions within the business (considering the small scale of most of those start-ups the last 
item should probably be interpreted as communication within the ownership team as well). 
Only an action plan emphasis had a significant effect in any analysis so the other type-of-use 
indicators are not included in Table 19. 
 The results are as follows: 
• The first three analyses ascribe no significant effect to having only an unwritten plan. 
This would indicate that there is no problem with planning as such; only with more 
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formal modes of planning. However, the fourth analysis calls this interpretation into 
question by ascribing a sizeable negative effect to the existence of an unwritten plan. 
• Having a written plan, whether informal or formal, is associated with a negative effect 
on getting Operational vs. Terminated, and a positive effect on Terminated vs. Still 
Trying. It is hard to interpret this as anything other than a negative impact on 
performance. This interpretation is reinforced by the result of the fourth analysis, 
where all forms of business plans at the time of the first interview are significantly 
and negatively associated with reaching regular positive cash flow. 
• Increasing the formalisation of the business plan is associated with a lower probability 
of becoming operational both in comparison with termination and with being still 
trying. 
• By contrast, revision of the business plan is associated with positive performance 
effects. Those who have revised the plan are more likely to be operational and even to 
have reached positive cash flow, and less likely to have terminated. 
• Using the business plan as an action plan to follow step by step is ascribed a strong 
negative effect on Operational vs. Terminated. The estimated negative effect on 
Positive Cash Flow vs. All Other is also strong, but due to relatively few founders 
strongly favouring this use the effect is associated with considerable statistical 
uncertainty. 
  Is it really possible that business planning has mainly negative effects on the success 
of business start-ups? In the light of all or our results, we think the following are reasons for 
taking the business planning findings very seriously: 
• Our results have strongly emphasised the importance of action, of making sure 
gestation activities are completed. To the extent that business planning diverts 
attention from action, it is logical that planning has negative performance effects. 
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• Our results have also emphasised the importance of adaptability. For example, we 
saw this in the importance of reorientating the start-up as a result of success with a 
customer, and just above we reported positive effects of revising the business plan. To 
the extent that business planning locks the start-up too firmly into a pre-determined 
path, it is logical that business planning can have negative effects on performance. 
This is particularly underscored by the negative effect we find of emphasising use of 
the business ‘as an action plan that you follow step by step.’ 
However, we would not argue that business plans and business planning are necessarily 
detrimental. Rather, we suggest business plans and business planning can have unintended 
negative consequences if used in the wrong way, or if they divert attention from other 
important activities. In fact, it is clearly the case that it would be illogical to exclude the 
possibility of business planning having positive effects. However, our results indicate such 
positive effects are often not realised, or they are over shadowed by negative counter-effects. 
Therefore, the results we have reported are strong reason for business founders, educators, 
consultants and investors to carefully consider how business plans and business planning is, 
could, and should be used in the venture creation process. They should also consider the 
extent to which business planning may occur at the expense of other actions. Such careful 
consideration of the proper role and use of business planning may help realise its potential 
beneficial effects and help avoid making it hinder success in the start-up process. 
For those who strongly believe in general, positive effects of business plans and 
business planning at early stages of new business development it is possible to come up with 
the following counter-arguments, which have some merit: 
• Our results are not inconsistent with the possibility that business planning helps 
terminating doomed start-up efforts that should better be terminated, thus reducing the 
waste of resources invested in inherently weak ventures. 
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• Our results are not inconsistent with the possibility that business planning helps 
prevent premature market roll-out, making firms that enter later but better prepared 
financially more successful in the long run. 
• Thus, our comparisons of outcomes in terms or reaching an operational stage vs. 
having terminated vs. still being actively involved in the start-up process do not 
preclude that business planning is associated with reduced waste in unsuccessful 
cases, and greater long-term profitability in successful cases. 
This said, it seems unlikely that these counter-arguments for positive impacts of 
business planning fully explain the apparently negative outcomes we report above. We would 
argue that the burden of evidence rests with those who hold these beliefs. Such evidence does 
not exist in the extant, research-based literature.   
Finally, we should point out that to the best of our knowledge there is no research 
suggesting that developing financial plans, that is budgeting and financial forecasting, is 
associated with detrimental performance effects. A possible reason for this is that the need for 
financial means is likely to be present event if the start-up undertakes some major of minor 
strategic re-orientation. In line with this, our results indicated neither positive nor negative 
effects of having prepared financial projections (Table 17). 
Summing up our results concerning the start-up process itself we find the following 
worth highlighting: 
• How and why the start-up process was initially triggered does not seem to have 
much influence on the type of outcomes we investigate here. 
• We find strong support for the importance of action; of completing concrete 
activities that bring the start-up closer to realisation. Undertaking more activities is 
not just associated with reaching a resolution more quickly but is ascribed a positive 
effect specifically on getting the start-up to an operational stage. 
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• Further, there is indication that an evenly paced process, rather than one 
characterised by spurts of high activity, is helpful for getting operational. 
• We also find evidence of the importance of adaptability; of being prepared to re-
orientate the start-up and revise one’s business plan, for example as a result of the 
reactions of potential customers. 
• We find strong reason to question the general value of business planning and 
business plans, especially when used as an action plan to be followed step by step. 
As possible reasons for negative effects of planning we suggest planning may divert 
attention from action and make the start-up less adaptable. These are not effects that 
follow from planning by logical necessity, but our results suggest they often do 
occur if they are not actively avoided. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this report we have analysed the drivers of outcomes of new firm start-up process, 
using unique, longitudinal data about 493 randomly selected nascent firms in Australia. We 
investigated the effects on start-up process outcomes of three groups of variables: 
Characteristics of the Venture; Resources Used in the Start-Up Process and Characteristics 
of the Start-Up Process Itself.  
 The outcome we were able to assess at this early stage of development was the status 
of the venture 12 months after the initial contact with the founder(s). There are three possible 
outcome states: having reached an operational state; being in a state of still trying to do so, 
and being terminated. We argued that it is important to contrast all three states separately 
because otherwise ‘success factors’ may be confounded with factors that merely affect the 
duration of the start-up process. Our results confirm this suspicion. In Table 20, we re-iterate 
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which factors appear to have a substantial effect on process duration without necessarily 
affecting the final outcome.  
Table 20. Factors non-trivially associated with start-up process duration  
Associated with a longer process Associated with a shorter process 
• Technological sophistication and/or 
novelty (hitech; R&D Focus; newness 
especially as regard product and 
production process) 
• Higher ambition (growth focus; non-local 
sales aspiration) 
• Higher education 
• Large firm managerial experience  
• Use of ‘bricolage’ 
• Retailing industry 
  
It is clear that more innovative and/or technically sophisticated ventures take longer to 
reach a start-up process resolution. It seems reasonable to assume that the person variables 
that have the same impact have it for the same reason, i.e., that founders with higher 
education and large firm managerial experience are more likely to engage in this type of start-
up. The use of ‘bricolage’ is also associated with prolonging of the process, but possibly also 
with genuinely reducing the risk of termination. Using ‘bricolage’ implies seeking workable 
rather than ‘perfect’ solutions; re-using resources in ways they were not originally intended 
for, and combining resources at hand in new and creative ways to move the start-up forward 
at minimum cost. Starting in retailing is a factor that facilitates a quicker process. 
 By contrast, Table 21 lists those factors that are non-trivially associated with more 
and less success – under the reasonable assumption that, by and large, getting operational is 
the most desirable outcome while terminating the start-up effort is the least desirable. It 
should be noted that not all of these associations necessarily reflect causal effects. Some of 
them may at least partly be results of attaining a certain outcome state rather than causing that 
63 
 
outcome, while others may merely co-evolve with the eventual outcome without actually 
determining it. 
Table 21.  Factors non-trivially associated with start-up process outcomes  
Associated with more favourable outcomes Associated with less favourable outcomes 
• Number of gestation activities completed 
at first interview and in the following 12 
month period 
• Hours invested by owners over the last 
12 months 
• Industry experience 
• Brick-and-Mortar Only 
• Bank loan funding 
• Credit card debt funding 
• Founder owning their house 
• Adaptability; willingness to revise venture 
idea and business plan 
• Evenly paced start-up process 
• Prior start-up success 
• Prior customer contact 
• Prior, excellent business reputation 
• Venture possessing some inimitability 
advantage 
• Specific venture activities: registering the 
business; completing product/service 
development; purchasing inputs; 
acquiring equipment/facilities; joining a 
trade association; initiating collaborative 
agreement with other organisation 
• Product (rather than Service) Focus  
• Team start-up 
• Non-European ethnic origin 
• Business planning; especially formal 
planning and a focus on using the plan as 
step-by step action plan  
• Other specific gestation activities: 
formalising ownership agreement; 
retaining a lawyer; determining regulatory 
requirements; contacting support agency 
 
 It is also worth mentioning some of those factors that seem to have surprisingly little 
influence on either the duration or the outcome of the process. The amount of money invested 
is perhaps primary among these. Mere passing of time does not bring the start-up closer to an 
outcome in either direction. Previous start-up experience also showed little effect, although 
previous successful experience has some positive association with favourable outcomes. 
Several results suggest competence in marketing does not seem helpful, possibly because 
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much such competence is geared towards a large/established firm situation and does not 
apply in the context of tiny, emerging businesses. What surprised the authors of this report 
most was the relative absence of effects of using other people’s help and advice, although 
there were some signs that social capital and social skills matter.   
With this in mind, what would we advise a prospective business founder based on those 
findings? Here are some suggestions: 
• Don’t be too concerned about how and why the business start-up process was 
triggered. If it grew out of a leisure activity and/or as a consequence of unemployment 
rather than a long held dream of starting a firm, it does not seem to matter all that 
much. 
• Carefully select your industry – yes, your industry. While our results suggest no 
outcome differences across industries, they clearly suggest that the founders’ prior 
experience from the industry of the start-up does matter. With such experience may 
come other factors that matter as well, such as having previous customer contacts and 
a favourable business reputation among relevant stakeholders. Presumably, founders 
whose start-ups grow out of a leisure activity that they are deeply engaged in and 
knowledgeable about experience similar benefits. 
• If your venture idea does not relate to prior industry experience or a leisure/hobby-
related experience it is probably a good idea to partner with someone who has the type 
of insider knowledge and contacts that follow from such experience. Our results 
suggest there are also downsides of having partners, but in the situation described 
above, our learned guess would be that the benefit of having the experience and 
contacts on board outweighs any drawbacks. In addition, other research suggests team 
start-ups perform better in later stages. 
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• Don’t be too concerned about having or not having the ‘right’ education for going into 
business. Our results do not suggest level or contents of education have much impact 
on start-up outcomes. 
• Give it time – your time. The mere passing of time does not get the venture going but 
those founders who put in the hours are rewarded with a much higher probability of 
getting the start-up operational. 
• Focus on action, on getting concrete things done that close the gap between having a 
dream and having a business. Our strongest outcome effects by far emerge for effort 
and action. The details of our results suggest as a founder you should complete a 
number of activities early in the process, presumably to establish to yourself and 
others alike that the start-up is really happening. From there on, the ideal process 
seems to be one of even, steady completion of additional ‘gestation activities’ over 
time rather than a process characterised by short flurries of activity separated by 
periods of relative idleness.  
• Be prepared to adapt – it may not be possible to think up a fully working concept as a 
desk assignment in advance. Our results show some founders succeed in part by 
adapting their venture in the light of customer reactions and by revising their business 
plan – if they had one – accordingly. 
• Having a business plan may be necessary if and when external funding is sought. 
Business planning may also be beneficial for thinking through opportunities and 
obstacles, or for aligning and communicating goals internally. However, be wary of 
the very real risk that business planning can have detrimental performance effects. 
This is more likely if you let the plan divert attention from action or lock your 
thinking too narrowly into a pre-determined path. Our results suggest that for 
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planning to be beneficial you should actively and purposely make sure it does not 
stand in the way of action and adaptability. 
• Be prepared to take on some debt, presumably using bank loans and personal credit 
cards (within reasonable limits). A frugal, ‘bricolage’ approach may have benefits but 
if over done it may make it difficult to ever reach an operational state.  
Before closing we should engage in some customary, academic hedging. For one thing, 
there is great individual variation and little sheer determinism in venture creation processes. 
This means that in a population of start-up efforts there will be those who meet every 
‘success factor’ we have identified – and yet fail. There will also be those that have all the 
dubious characteristics according to our analysis – and yet manage to establish their business 
successfully. Our results speak to averages and the bigger picture, and cannot be used for 
very precise prediction of the fate of particular cases. Readers should also be aware that the 
results apply to ‘typical’ or ‘average’ Australian start-ups; they may not all apply to the rare 
breed of start-ups that enter the world of Venture Capital funding; multi-million dollar 
acquisitions, or initial public offerings (IPOs). Neither do they necessarily correctly represent, 
for example, outcome drivers in the context of social enterprises. 
Further, although what we have presented arguably represents more systematic and 
credible research-based knowledge than what existed before in Australia, we call this report 
‘preliminary’ for two reasons. First, the interdependencies among the many elements in the 
start-up process are not easily disentangled. We intend to continue to deepen the analysis of 
the CAUSEE data, and this may lead to (partial) revision of some of the results and 
interpretations we have presented here. Second, data collection for CAUSEE will continue 
with two more waves of comprehensive interviewing. This longer term perspective may also 
lead to new revelations and (partial) revision of what we have concluded in the present report. 
In addition, the outcomes we have contrasted – getting operational vs. terminating the effort, 
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do not translate directly into long term financial return on investment. On both of these 
accounts – probing further into interdependencies among outcome drivers and analysing 
effects on other types of outcomes – future reports from the CAUSEE project should be able 
to further nuance the picture. 
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